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Abstract 
 
Recent literature in small business management suggests that small businesses are financially 
constrained. They also face challenges of poor financial performance, which leads to their failure. 
Literature also shows that family involvement improves small business performance. We asked 
research participants consisting of small business owners from India about their beliefs and 
perceptions regarding the relationship between non-resident Indian family members (NRIs), financial 
support from NRIs, internal financing sources, and the financial performance of small businesses. 
Results indicate that the involvement of NRIs as foreign directors, financial support from NRIs, and 
internal financing sources improve the financial performance of small businesses in India. Firms with 
NRIs are more likely to perform better than without NRIs. Moreover, the influence of NRIs on the 
financial performance of small businesses is higher in the service industry than the manufacturing 
industry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly agreed that small businesses are 
financially constrained (Joeveer, 2013) and face the 
challenges of poor performance; therefore, it is 
important to find ways by which financial challenges 
can be minimized and financial performance of small 
business firms improved to minimize their failure 
rates. The Indian provision of Micro, Small, and 
Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act of 
2006, classifies the Micro, Small, and Medium 
Enterprises (MSMEs) into two categories, 
manufacturing and services (Lahiri, 2012).   
Small businesses initially are either sole 
proprietorships, or partnerships. Even though these 
firms continue to operate as either sole proprietorships 
or partnerships, the majority of these small businesses 
are passed on to descendants or to non-family 
members (the voting majority usually remaining in 
the hands of family members), so anyone with a 
financial interest in these small businesses is called a 
shareholder (Gill et al., 2014). On that basis, small 
businesses are characterized as a firm in which these 
shareholders belong to the same family (who either 
live in the same country or abroad) and participate 
substantially in the management, direction, and 
operation of their firms. Thus, using this shareholder 
model, in a small business, the control tends to be in 
the hands of the family; including the founders, who 
pass on their business to their descendants. 
Continuing to label the owners as shareholders, small 
businesses are companies in which one family or 
more than one family, linked by kinship, close 
affinity, or solid alliances holds a sufficiently large 
share of risk capital to enable the family to make 
decisions regarding strategic management (Gulzar and 
Wang, 2010).   
In Asian countries, families have unique values, 
history, culture, background, unwritten rules, and 
communication methods that families use to direct, 
manage, and control small businesses (Gulzar and 
Wang, 2010; Rouf, 2011). Thus, family members who 
live abroad participate in the governance of small 
businesses over the telephone, provide financial 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 2, 2015, Continued - 5 
 
 
543 
support to small businesses, and visit India from time 
to time to make important decisions with the 
consultation of members of the board of directors who 
are, in the majority of cases, from the same family. 
Although previous studies showed that family 
involvement improves financial performance of small 
businesses (Kim and Gao, 2013), none of the studies 
showed the impact of non-resident family members 
on the financial performance of small businesses; 
therefore, this study addresses this gap in the literature 
by showing the impact of non-resident Indian family 
members (NRIs) on the financial performance of 
small businesses. The definition of NRIs, in the 
context of this study, is family members who live 
abroad, provide financial support, act as foreign 
members of the board of directors, and are involved in 
decision making related to small businesses.  
Previous studies on the role of foreign 
independent directors in firm performance (Masulis, 
Wang and Xie, 2012) and the role of family 
involvement in small business performance (Kim and 
Gao, 2013) failed to show the impact of non-resident 
family members (who are also members of the board 
of directors) on the financial performance of small 
businesses. Since NRIs live abroad, we classify them 
as foreign directors. This leads to following research 
questions: 
Does the presence of NRIs on the board of 
directors improve the financial performance of small 
business firms?  
Do internal financing sources built with the 
financial support of NRIs improve the financial 
performance of small businesses? 
Do the small businesses that have the presence 
of NRIs on the board of directors perform better than 
the small businesses that do not have the presence of 
NRIs?  
This research study proposes that the 
involvement of NRIs has a strong impact on the 
financial performance of small business firms. This is 
because NRIs are involved in decision making by 
acting as foreign directors and providing financial 
support to minimize financial challenges required for 
the operations of small businesses. Our results suggest 
that the presence of NRIs enable small businesses to 
perform better than small businesses without NRIs. 
Thus, empirical results of this study support the 
hypotheses that the financial performance of small 
businesses improve through the involvement of NRIs 
directly and indirectly. The present study contributes 
to the small business performance literature.   
The organization of the remainder of the paper is 
as follows. Section two examines the previous 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section three 
describes the data and methodology used to 
investigate our research questions. Section four 
discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section 
five concludes and considers the implications of the 
findings. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Previous studies noted the relationships between 
family involvement, new venture debt financing, and 
small business success (Chua et al., 2011) but ignored 
the role of non-resident family members who play an 
important role in small business performance by 
providing financial support and by serving on the 
board of directors. The findings of Kim and Gao 
(2013) suggested that although family involvement in 
management has no direct effect on the firm 
performance, the relationship between family 
involvement and firm performance is more positive 
when a firm's support for family-longevity goals is 
higher versus lower. The findings of Brenes, 
Madrigal, and Requena (2011) suggested that a board 
made up of non-family and family members results in 
a balance that is very important to dynamic operations 
which leads to improvement in small business 
performance.   
The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), which focused on the function of the board, 
serves as the basic foundation of the structure of the 
board of directors in small business firms (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Based on 
agency theory, agency conflict (i.e., conflict between 
principal and agent) takes place in corporations 
because managers may not work in the best interests 
of shareholders to make ‘corporate assets’ productive 
and to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, 
including foreign independent directors on the board 
of directors can be an effective instrument for 
monitoring senior managers and addressing the 
agency problem and reducing agency costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010) in 
publicly traded firms.  
However, the agency problem in small 
businesses is insignificant because family members 
control the majority of small businesses and they can 
increase the benefits of the agency agreement between 
owners and managers (Schulze et al., 2003). 
According to agency theory, the main contribution of 
independent directors is their ability to remain 
independent while overseeing operating matters, 
protecting the assets of the firm, and holding 
managers accountable to the firm’s various key 
stakeholders to ensure the future survival and success 
of the enterprise (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005). 
Similar to agency theory, the contribution of NRIs can 
be in the form of participation in important board 
decisions to protect the assets of the small business 
firms.  
Another foundation of the structure of the board 
of directors is the stewardship theory of Donaldson 
and Davis (1991) which indicated that the motives of 
employees should align with the objectives of the 
corporation to pursue the interests of the shareholders 
(Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory also indicates 
that the main role of the board of directors is to advise 
and support management by acting as stewards rather 
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than to discipline and monitor as agency theory 
prescribes (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Pieper et al., 
2008; Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010). NRIs, 
acting as stewards, function as foreign and outside 
directors (independent and affiliated). They provide 
advice in aligning the interests of managers (who in 
the majority of cases are family members) with the 
small business organizations and support the board of 
directors in making important governance decisions to 
improve the prosperity and survivability of the small 
businesses. Thus, stewardship theory offers an 
alternative explanation for the relationship between 
NRIs and firm performance. Arregle et al. (2007) also 
argued that family members are sincere about the firm 
because it is part of their collective patrimony and is 
often the main asset of the family. In addition, both 
the agency theory and the stewardship theory indicate 
that independent directors exert a positive influence 
on firm performance, although the role of the board of 
directors is different in each theory. 
Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010) argued that 
under agency theory, independent directors monitor 
and control insiders and/or the family; and under 
stewardship theory, independent directors provide 
valuable outside advice and counsel to the firm. 
Therefore, both theories apply to the role of NRIs in 
the board of directors as foreign independent 
directors. Stewardship theory indicates that 
independent directors exert positive influence on firm 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). The 
findings of Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010) also 
indicated that affiliated directors have a positive 
influence on firm performance in small business 
firms.  
Literature also indicates that foreign directors 
can be less effective because of geographic distance 
and time constraints. Other challenges include being 
cut off from local networks and business duties 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), time zone differences, 
security concerns, and lack of knowledge about the 
country’s accounting rules, laws and regulations, 
governance standards, and management methods 
(Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). Based on these 
challenges, one may argue that foreign directors 
(NRIs in this case) may not be very adept at 
monitoring the effectiveness of the corporation, can 
lead to greater agency problems between managers 
and shareholders, and lead to diminished firm 
performance.  
CEO duality is a common characteristic for 
leadership in small businesses and takes place when 
one person holds the positions of Chairman of the 
Board and CEO or, at least, is responsible for the 
duties usually associated with those positions. Other 
family members, including NRI family members, 
serve as members of the board of directors to curb 
agency problems related to CEO duality as described 
by Fama and Jensen (1983). Curbing agency 
problems enhances small business performance. Thus, 
CEO duality helps in improving the performance of 
small businesses and in fact, it leads to better firm 
performance than does separate executive leadership 
(Gill et al., 2014).   
Small businesses often have a smaller board 
size, usually between two to four members (Gill et al., 
2014). Amran and Ahmad (2009) argued that firms 
with smaller board sizes consistently make better 
decisions, which in turn, lead to better performance 
relative to firms with the duality of leadership 
structure. The responsibilities of the board of directors 
include, but are not limited to, making strategic 
decisions to mitigate business risk, lowering the cost 
of capital, and improving the performance of the firm. 
According to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012), foreign 
directors contribute to and improve firm performance 
and shareholder value through their advisory role to 
make strategic decisions. In small businesses, foreign 
directors strengthen corporate governance, which in 
turn has a positive impact on the performance of the 
firm. Previous studies found that stronger corporate 
governance had a positive influence on firm 
performance. For example, Kajola (2008) found 
positive relationships between board size, CEO 
duality, and firm performance. The findings of 
Jackling and Johl (2009) supported the findings of 
Kajola (2008) in that larger board size positively 
influences firm performance in India. Most recently, 
Gill et al. (2014) found that stronger corporate 
governance positively influences the performance of 
small businesses in Canada.  
NRIs not only contribute to sound decisions 
related to small business firms, but also inject equity 
capital into small businesses, which in turn, helps in 
building internal financial resources. It is clear from 
the findings of The Press Trust of India (2011) that 
NRIs invest funds in the Indian economy. Kroll and 
Cohen (2013) indicated that small enterprises suffer 
from limited access to equity and debt markets. 
Therefore, small businesses tend to rely more on 
internal financing sources than external financing 
sources. Internal sources of funding include funds 
from family members (including NRIs) and external 
sources of funding include debt capital arranged by 
borrowings from banks, friends, and other private 
financing sources (Gill et al., 2012). Moreover, small 
firms are financially constrained (Joeveer, 2013), are 
associated with higher volatility (Bottazzi, Secchi, 
and Tamagni, 2014), have low access to bank loans 
(Canton et al., 2013), and face tighter pricing terms 
and conditions (Drakos, 2013). Therefore, internal 
financial resources provided by NRIs and generated 
by retained earnings are among the most important 
resources of the small businesses that help improve 
performance.  
Internal financing sources generated by small 
business owners and their family members follow the 
“pecking order” theory of finance developed by 
Myers (1984), which stated that firms use internally 
generated funds in the form of retained earnings 
before turning to external sources. Yusuf (1995) 
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found that initial investment and on-going access to 
financial resources are among the most important 
factors that affect success in small-scale businesses. 
Mallick and Yang (2011), by taking a sample of 
11,000 firms from 47 countries over a period of 1997-
2007, found that retained earnings improve firm 
performance.  
In summary, the theoretical foundation of this 
study starts with the agency theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and the stewardship theory of 
Donaldson and Davis (1991). NRIs serving as foreign 
independent directors assist board members (who are 
family members in the majority of cases) in 
formulating corporate policies that help monitor 
managers to mitigate agency problems and to reduce 
agency costs. NRIs, in the context of stewardship 
theory, play the role of stewards for their family to 
provide advice in aligning the interest of managers 
with the small business organization, and support the 
board of directors in making important governance 
decisions to improve the prosperity and survivability 
of the small business firm. Thus, both agency theory 
and stewardship theory form the theoretical 
foundation of this study. NRIs not only contribute in 
board decisions but also inject equity capital into the 
small business firms through financial support to 
build internal financing sources, which in turn, 
improve the financial performance of small 
businesses. Therefore, it is theorized that the presence 
of NRIs on the board of directors and the financial 
support from NRIs to increase internal financial 
resources positively affect the financial performance 
of the small businesses in India. Hence, it is 
hypothesized: 
H1: The higher the presence of NRIs on the 
board of directors, the better the financial 
performance of small businesses. 
H2: The financial support of NRIs improves the 
financial performance of small businesses. 
H3: Firms with NRIs perform better than the 
firms without NRIs. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
We collected sample data to examine our hypotheses 
by conducting a survey among small business owners 
in Punjab, a state that is located in the northwest of 
India. These participants are mainly from Punjab and 
its surrounding areas including Ludhiana, Malerkotla, 
Bathinda, Raikot, Banga, Hoshiar Pur, Kaputhala, 
Phagwara, Jalandhar, and Sahid Bhagat Singh Nagar. 
We selected Punjab rather than other states of India 
for several critical reasons. First, a large number of 
residents from Punjab are living or have lived abroad 
for many years, and they usually maintain strong 
home ties compared to non-residents from other parts 
of India (Varrel, 2012). Second, most Punjabi non-
residents are engaged in self-owned businesses 
overseas compared to other non-resident Indians, and 
thus are capable of guiding their family members in 
India.  
Since the whole population is “abstract” (i.e., it 
is not possible to obtain a list of all members of the 
focal population), a non-probability (purposive) 
sample was constructed. In a purposive sample, 
screening of participants takes place for inclusion 
based on criteria associated with members of the focal 
population (Huck, 2008). To obtain a reasonable 
sample size, we compiled an extensive list of small 
business owners’ names and telephone numbers to 
distribute surveys and to conduct telephone 
interviews. The sample included approximately 700 
research participants encompassing Indian small 
business owners. We eventually collected responses 
from a total of 152 (21.71%) interviewees over the 
telephone, through personal visits, and by mail. We 
were successful in conducting 17 personal interviews 
with NRIs in Canada and USA, and their family 
members in India who operate small businesses. We 
discarded two of the survey responses due to 
inconsistency and incomplete answers. Common 
method bias does not appear to be a problem with this 
study because, although self-reported, we measured 
our variables objectively. Moreover, a factor analysis 
(e.g., Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) indicated that 
common method bias does not seem to be a concern 
for this study in terms of reliability or validity.  
 
3.2 Variables and Their Measurements  
 
We selected several variables common to similar 
studies. Further, we limited the total number of 
variables due to the relatively small sample size and 
for our convenience of conducting surveys over 
telephone. To collect raw data for constructing the 
variables, we designed the survey questions in such a 
way that respondents felt comfortable disclosing some 
information with confidentiality. For instance, rather 
than asking for a disclosure of actual sales revenue in 
recent years, we provided three individual ranges of 
sales, such as, total sales of (i) INR 0 – INR 600,000; 
(ii) INR 600,001 – INR 900,000, and (iii) more than 
INR 900,000 to construct the relevant variable. 
Therefore, we based most of the variables discussed 
below on ordinal responses.  
 Financial performance. The definition of 
financial performance (FP) for the purposes of this 
study is small business owners’ general perception 
about the changes in net profit margin, return on 
investment, cash flow from operations, and market 
value of their small businesses. Following the 
definition, we selected four separate components to 
measure the FP index. In the survey, we asked all 
participants to rate the extent to which they believe 
there are changes in (i) net profit margin, (ii) return on 
investment, (iii) cash flow from operations, and (iv) 
market value of their small businesses. Their 
responses were categorized on a five-point Likert 
Scale assigning 5 as “Gone up a lot” and 1 as “Gone 
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down a lot”. Responses were initially collected for 
each of the above four sources of financial 
performance. The four measures are highly correlated 
with correlation values ranging from 0.85 to 0.87. 
Therefore, we constructed a new index by using 
principal component analysis (PCA). The FP index 
was constructed using the first component which 
explains approximately 87.36% of the variation.
2
  
Non-resident Indians. Non-resident Indians 
(NRI) is measured as a categorical variable where NRI 
= 1 if any family member of micro-entrepreneurs 
lives outside India. Alternatively, NRI = 0 if none of 
their family members reside overseas. NRI is the key 
independent variable in the empirical model.    
Financial support from non-resident Indians. 
Financial support from non-resident Indians (FS) is 
measured as a categorical variable where FS = 1 if a 
small business receives financial support from NRIs. 
Alternatively, FS = 0 if a small business does not 
receive financial support from NRIs.    
Internal financing sources. Internal financing 
sources (IFS) measures small business owners’ 
capacity to invest his or her personal and family assets 
into his or her own small business. Respondents were 
asked to rate the extent to which they perceive that 
they have adequate funds from either personal savings 
(IFS1) or family wealth (IFS2). This response is 
categorized on a five-point Likert scale, defining five 
as very adequate and one as very inadequate. The 
correlation between IFS1 and IFS2 is 0.83 (not 
reported). Thus, a new index (IFS index) is 
constructed based on the first principal component of 
the two factors: that is, IFS1 and IFS2.
3
   
Board size. Board size (BS) is a categorical 
variable where BS = 1 if a small business had four or 
more directors. Alternatively, BS = 0 if a small 
business had three or less directors. We created two 
dummy variables based on this information for 
empirical analyses. For example, we created a dummy 
variable, FS1 if the firm had three or less directors 
and BS2 if the firm had four or more directors.  
CEO duality. CEO duality (CD) is a dummy 
variable with assigned value of 1 if a small business 
owner/operator is both CEO and Chair of the same 
company, or 0 otherwise.  
Board meetings. Board meetings (MT) is a 
categorical variable where MT = 1 if a small business 
had 13 or more board meetings per year. 
Alternatively, MT = 0 if a small business had 12 or 
less board meetings per year. We created two dummy 
variables based on this information for empirical 
analyses. For example, we created a dummy variable, 
MT1 if the firm had 12 or less board meetings per 
year and MT2 if the firm had 13 or more meetings per 
year.  
                                                          
2
 The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 3.494, 
0.234, 0.155, and 0.117, respectively. Factors that have 
eigenvalues greater than one are included in the construction 
of the component (Kaiser, 1960). 
3
 The eigenvalues of the first and second principal 
components are 1.830 and 0.170, and the corresponding 
variances are 91.517% and 8.483%, respectively. As a result, 
IFS index is constructed using the first component.  
Small business owner experience. A small 
business owner’s years of experience, (EXP) is a 
categorical variable. During the survey, respondents 
selected any one of the four alternative choices, such 
as, 1 = 4 or less than 4 years; 2 = 5-9 years; 3 = 10-30 
years; and 4 = 31 years and above. Following the 
responses, we created four separate dummy variables 
including EXP1, EXP2, EXP3, and EXP4, 
respectively. As an example, we defined EXP1 as a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if an owner of a 
small business has experience of zero to four years, 
otherwise it is zero.  
Education. The education of the small business 
owner (EDU) is a dummy variable with an assigned 
value of 1 if a small business owner had master’s 
degree or higher, otherwise it is 0.  
Firm size. Firm size (SIZE) is a categorical 
variable. In the survey, we identified three different 
firm sizes as follows: (i) firms with sales from INR 0 
to INR 600,000, (ii) firms with sales from INR 
600,001 to INR 900,000, and (iii) firms with sales 
above INR 900,000. During the survey, respondents 
choose only one category where the average sale of 
their business belongs. For empirical analyses, we 
identified these responses as three separate dummy 
variables. For instance, if sales lie between INR 0 and 
INR 600,000, we defined a dummy variable, SIZE1, 
equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, SIZE2 (SIZE3) 
is another dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
company’s sales are within the range of INR 600,001 
and INR 900,000 (≥ INR 900,000), 0 otherwise.  
Number of employees. Number of employees 
(EMP) is a categorical variable. Five choices are 
given in the survey including one if the number of 
employees is between 0 and 4, two for employees 
between 5 and 9, three for the range of 10 and 30 
employees, four for employees between 31 and 99, 
and five for employees equal to or above 100. We 
created five dummy variables based on this 
information for empirical analyses. For example, we 
created a dummy variable, EMP1, if employee range 
lies in the first employee group of 0 and 4 employees. 
Following the definition of each category of number 
of employees, we created the other four dummy 
variables, EMP2, EMP3, EMP4, and EMP5. 
Industry. We distinguished all small businesses 
under two broad categories: manufacturing and 
services. Accordingly, we created two industry-
specific dummy variables, IND1 and IND2. By 
definition, IND1 (IND2) are equal to 1 if a firm 
belongs to the manufacturing (services) sector, and 
zero otherwise. By including IND dummy, we also 
control for industry fixed effects in empirical models.  
 
4. Analysis and Discussion of Empirical 
Results 
 
4.1 Empirical Model  
 
NRIs improve the financial performance of small 
businesses by serving on the board of directors and by 
providing financial support. Thus, NRIs play an 
important role, both directly and indirectly, in the 
improvement of financial performance of small 
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businesses in India. We therefore examined the 
relationship between NRI and FP. NRI is considered 
as a main explanatory variable in FP. We considered 
all other variables as individual control variables. We 
estimated the following basic model: 
 
Yi = α0 + α1.NRIi + ∑δijXij + εit     (1) 
 
In the model, i refers to individual small 
business, Yi is FP of firm i, and Xij represents 
individual control variables (j) corresponding to firm 
i. εit is a normally distributed disturbance term. In the 
estimated model, α1 measures the magnitude at which 
the presence of non-resident Indians help small 
businesses in improving FP relative to other 
companies without non-resident Indians. We extend 
this model by considering a different set of control 
variables one at a time. We estimated the coefficient 
of variables of the model by applying ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Data Analysis  
 
In the dataset, most of the variables, except FP and 
IFS indices, are individual dummy variables. The data 
exhibits that the distribution of both FP and IFS is 
almost symmetrical around their mean values and thus 
there is no outlier present in either of these indices. 
We examined the differences in variables among 
individual firms with and without non-resident Indian 
relatives.  
We found that financial performance is 
significantly higher among small businesses with non-
resident Indians. As an example, the mean FP score 
among firms with NRIs is 0.39 compared to -0.56 in 
the case of firms without NRIs, and their differences 
are significant at the one percent level. Likewise, the 
mean IFS among firms with NRIs is greater than that 
of firms without NRIs (0.28 versus -0.41). This is 
because small businesses receive financial support 
from NRIs.  
We further observed that small businesses with 
NRIs, large board size, CEO duality, and a higher 
number of board meetings are able to maintain a high 
level of financial performance. Likewise, average 
years of small business owner’s experience are higher 
among those firms that have NRIs compared to other 
firms that do not have NRI support. Finally, the results 
exhibited that firms with NRIs are a little larger in size 
than the firms without NRIs. However, the impact of 
NRIs on financial performance differs between service 
and manufacturing industries. 
The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that 
NRI, FS, IFS, and FP are positively and significantly 
correlated (ρNRI, FP = 0.468; ρFS, FP = 0.388; ρIFS, FP = 
0.475, all significant at the one percent level), 
implying that firms with NRIs, financial support from 
NRIs, and high internal financing sources improve the 
financial performance of small businesses in India. 
Further, the results show a positive relationship 
between large board size and FP (ρBS, FP = 0.387), 
CEO duality and FP (ρCD, FP = 0.496), higher number 
of board meetings and FP (ρMT, FP = 0.327), education 
and FP (ρEDU, FP = 0.274), firm size and FP (ρSIZE, FP = 
0.266), and number of employees and FP (ρEMP, FP = 
0.433), all significant at one percent.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
FP1) Net profit margin  3.75 0.91 1 4 5 
FP2) Return on investment  3.73 1.00 1 4 5 
FP3) Cash flow  3.95 1.02 1 4 5 
FP4) Total market value of small business  3.72 0.96 1 4 5 
IFS1) Personal financial resources  3.51 0.90 1 4 5 
IFS2) Family financial resources  3.86 1.04 1 4 5 
NRI 0.59 0.49 0 1 1 
FS 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 
BS1 0.82 0.38 0 1 1 
BS2 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
CD 0.85 0.36 0 1 1 
MT1 0.90 0.30 0 1 1 
MT2 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
EXP1 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
EXP2 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
EXP3 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 
EXP4 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
EDU 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
SIZE1 0.11 0.32 0 0 1 
SIZE2 0.25 0.44 0 0 1 
SIZE3 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 
EMP1 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 
EMP2 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 
EMP3 0.19 0.39 0 0 1 
IND 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
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Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from 
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT), 
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND). 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Firms with and without NRIs 
 
Variable With NRIs Without NRIs Mean Difference 
FP 0.39 -0.56 0.95*** 
FP1) Net profit margin 4.08 3.26 0.82*** 
FP2) Return on investment 4.12 3.15 0.97* 
FP3) Cash flow 4.28 3.46 0.82*** 
FP4) Total market value of small business 4.06 3.23 0.83 
IFS 0.28 -0.41 0.69*** 
IFS1) Personal financial resources 3.76 3.15 0.61** 
IFS2) Family financial resources 4.12 3.48 0.64*** 
FS 0.40 0.00 0.40*** 
BS1 0.75 0.92 -0.17** 
BS2 0.25 0.08 0.17** 
CD 0.92 0.75 0.17*** 
MT1 0.85 0.97 -0.12** 
MT2 0.15 0.03 0.12** 
EXP1 0.16 0.33 -0.17 
EXP2 0.37 0.31 0.06** 
EXP3 0.02 0.00 0.02 
EXP4 0.36 0.30 0.06 
EDU 0.38 0.26 0.12 
SIZE1 0.06 0.20 -0.14** 
SIZE2 0.21 0.31 -0.10 
SIZE3 0.73 0.49 0.24** 
EMP1 0.42 0.77 -0.35*** 
EMP2 0.30 0.16 0.14* 
EMP3 0.28 0.05 0.23*** 
IND 0.42 0.21 0.21** 
Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from 
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT), 
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND). ***, ** 
and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Correlation Table 
 
 FP NRI FS IFS BS1 BS2 CD MT1 MT2 EXP1 EXP2 
FP  1           
NRI  0.468*** 1          
FS  0.388*** 0.465*** 1         
IFS  0.475*** 0.337*** 0.318*** 1        
BS1  -0.387*** -0.211*** -0.184** -0.245*** 1       
BS2  0.387*** 0.211*** 0.184** 0.245*** -1.000*** 1      
CD  0.496*** 0.232*** 0.145 0.250*** -0.194** 0.194** 1     
MT1  -0.327*** -0.185** -0.177** -0.259*** 0.191** -0.191** -0.075 1    
MT2  0.327*** 0.185** 0.177** 0.259*** -0.191** 0.191** 0.075 -1.000*** 1   
EXP1  -0.445*** -0.200** -0.081 -0.096 0.088 -0.088 -0.406*** 0.021 -0.021 1  
EXP2  0.062 0.061 0.115 -0.072 -0.023 0.023 0.144 0.056 -0.056 -0.394*** 1 
EXP3  0.028 0.096 0.207** 0.071 -0.097 0.097 0.048 0.039 -0.039 -0.063 -0.085 
EXP4  0.151 0.067 -0.099 0.089 0.074 -0.074 0.173** 0.047 -0.047 -0.383*** -0.515*** 
EDU  0.274*** 0.125 0.099 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.093 -0.141 0.141 -0.146 0.050 
SIZE1  -0.404*** -0.218*** -0.152 -0.346*** 0.058 -0.058 -0.268*** 0.049 -0.049 0.409*** -0.128 
SIZE2  0.000 -0.111 -0.040 -0.166** 0.034 -0.034 -0.018 0.092 -0.092 0.051 0.123 
SIZE3  0.266*** 0.243*** 0.136 0.378*** -0.068 0.068 0.193** -0.115 0.115 -0.315*** -0.027 
EMP1  -0.501*** -0.351*** -0.382*** -0.512*** 0.319*** -0.319*** -0.254*** 0.287*** -0.287*** 0.127 -0.032 
EMP2  0.216*** 0.159 0.113 0.287*** -0.134 0.134 0.150 0.036 -0.036 -0.088 0.006 
EMP3  0.433*** 0.292*** 0.372*** 0.329*** -0.265*** 0.265*** 0.150 -0.411*** 0.411*** -0.096 0.046 
IND  0.051 0.211*** 0.199** 0.237*** -0.037 0.037 0.093 -0.141 0.141 -0.079 0.079 
  
EXP3 EXP4 EDU SIZE1 SIZE2 SIZE3 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 IND 
 
EXP3  1           
EXP4  -0.082 1          
EDU  0.041 -0.080 1         
SIZE1  -0.042 -0.164** -0.164** 1        
SIZE2  -0.068 -0.152 -0.054 -0.208** 1       
SIZE3  0.088 0.245*** 0.157 -0.470*** -0.766*** 1      
EMP1  -0.014 0.028 -0.085 0.317*** 0.177** -0.368*** 1     
EMP2  0.068 0.055 -0.077 -0.205** -0.156 0.275*** -0.646*** 1    
EMP3  -0.056 -0.085 0.206** -0.171** -0.043 0.151 -0.540*** -0.274*** 1   
IND  0.041 -0.020 0.190** -0.208** -0.379*** 0.479*** -0.313*** 0.120 0.278*** 1  
Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from 
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT), 
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND). ***, ** 
and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.3 Regression Results and Discussion 
 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation 
1. We find that firms with non-resident Indians 
perform better compared to those without NRIs. As 
shown in model specification I, the coefficient of NRI 
is 0.950, significant at the one percent level. In the 
following model specifications, we include a set of 
control variables one at a time. For instance, in model 
specification II, we include financial support from 
NRIs (FS) and firm’s internal source of financing 
(IFS), and then we include BS, CD, and MT2 in 
model specification III and so forth. Regardless of 
individual model specifications, we find a significant 
and positive coefficient of NRI, suggesting that firms 
with NRIs perform better compared to those without 
NRIs. This finding remains robust when we consider 
all control variables together (refer to model 
specification IV).  
The results exhibit that financial support from 
NRIs, board size, CEO duality, and higher number of 
board meetings per year improves the financial 
performance of small business. The findings show 
that as firm’s size increases, financial performance of 
the small business improves. Increase in size of a 
small business signals positive growth. In model 
specification IV, the coefficient of EXP4 is 0.308, 
significant at the five percent level. Likewise, the 
evidence shows that education level of small business 
owners and increases in the number of employees 
improve the financial performance of small 
businesses. As an example, the coefficient of EDU in 
model specification IV is 0.383, significant at the five 
percent level.  The findings in appendix B show that 
education and experience of NRIs and their financial 
support and participation in the board decisions 
improve the financial performance of small 
businesses in India.    
Table 4 also shows the coefficient of NRI is 
1.080 and 0.690, significant at the one percent level in 
the service and manufacturing industries respectively 
(refer to model specification I in service and 
manufacturing industries). In model specification II of 
the service industry, we find a significant and positive 
coefficients of NRI, IFS, CD, EXP4, EDU, SIZE2, 
and EMP3; in specification model II of the 
manufacturing industry, we find a significant and 
positive coefficients of BS2, CD, MT2, SIZE2, SIZE3, 
EMP2, and EMP3. These findings suggest that small 
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business service firms with NRIs perform better 
compared to those manufacturing firms with NRIs.  
 
 
Table 4. Effects of NRIs on Financial Performance 
 
 
Variables 
Overall Results Service Industry Manufacturing Industry 
I II III IV I II I II 
NRI 0.950*** 0.583*** 0.403** 0.317** 1.080*** 0.392** 0.690** 0.004 
 (6.44) (3.71) (2.92) (2.54) (6.14) (2.56) (2.37) (0.02) 
FS - 0.348* 0.286* 0.246* - 0.344 - 0.149 
 - (1.94) (1.84) (1.67) - (1.60) - (0.73) 
IFS - 0.331*** 0.201** 0.098 - 0.183** - -0.051 
 - (4.58) (3.08) (1.51) - (2.23) - (-0.46) 
BS2 - - 0.461** 0.427** - 0.306 - 0.459** 
 - - (2.91) (2.93) - (1.51) - (2.07) 
CD - - 0.946*** 0.702*** - 0.602** - 1.356*** 
 - - (5.51) (4.31) - (3.06) - (4.33) 
MT2 - - 0.521** 0.399** - 0.310 - 0.565* 
 - - (2.58) (2.09) - (1.02) - (1.94) 
EXP2 - - - 0.137 - 0.157 - -0.075 
 - - - (0.98) - (0.90) - (-0.34) 
EXP3 - - - -0.207 - 0.217 - -0.496 
 - - - (-0.44) - (0.31) - (-0.77) 
EXP4 - - - 0.308** - 0.332* - 0.117 
 - - - (2.12) - (1.79) - (0.50) 
EDU - - - 0.383** - 0.456** - 0.032 
 - - - (3.35) - (2.85) - (0.17) 
SIZE2 - - - 0.471** - 0.356* - 2.023** 
 - - - (2.40) - (1.69) - (2.25) 
SIZE3 - - - 0.471** - 0.353 - 2.070** 
 - - - (2.30) - (1.53) - (3.10) 
EMP2 - - - 0.383** - 0.149 - 0.705** 
 - - - (2.63) - (0.76) - (3.06) 
EMP3 - - - 0.610** - 0.694** - 0.785** 
 - - - (3.31) - (2.57) - (2.97) 
IND - - - -0.477*** - - - - 
 - - - (-3.68) - - - - 
Constant -0.563** -0.429*** -1.250*** -1.705*** -0.439* -3.903*** -0.439* -3.903*** 
 (-4.96) (-3.96) (-7.65) (-8.83) (-1.75) (-5.79) (-1.75) (-5.79) 
Obs 150 150 150 150 50 50 50 50 
χ2-test 41.53*** 26.14*** 26.10*** 16.60*** 5.61** 8.04*** 5.61** 8.04*** 
R2 0.219 0.349 0.523 0.650 0.105 0.7639 0.105 0.7639 
Adj R2 0.214 0.336 0.503 0.611 0.086 0.668 0.086 0.668 
Notes: In the regression models, the dependent variable is financial performance of small business (FP). Independent 
variables include non-resident Indians (NRI), financial support from NRIs (FS), internal financial sources (IFS), board size 
(BS), CEO duality (CD), number of board meetings per year (MT), CEO experience (EXP), education (EDU), firm size (FS), 
number of employees (EMP), and industry dummy (IND). Coefficients of models are estimated by applying ordinary least 
square method. t-statistics are given in the parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance of each coefficient at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The small business literature demonstrates how 
family involvement improves the performance of 
small businesses. This study concentrated on the 
impact of NRIs as foreign directors on the 
performance of small businesses in India. This study 
provides a mechanism through which small business 
owners may improve financial performance. The 
paper shows that NRIs not only provide financial 
support to small business owners but also serve as 
foreign directors to improve the financial performance 
of small business. Previous study on family 
involvement in management by Kim and Gao (2013) 
found that although family involvement in 
management has no direct effect on firm performance, 
the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance is more positive when a firm’s support 
for family-longevity goals is higher versus lower. Our 
results related to NRIs lend some support to the 
findings of Kim and Gao (2013) in that the 
involvement of NRIs in management decisions and 
their financial support improve the financial 
performance of small businesses. The findings of this 
study also lend some support to the findings of 
Brenes, Madrigal, and Requena (2011) in that the 
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involvement of NRIs results in the dynamic operation 
of small businesses which leads to improvement in 
business performance. In addition, education and 
experience of non-resident family members and their 
financial support and participation in the board 
decisions improve the financial performance of small 
businesses. 
 
6. Limitations  
 
This study also relies on the perceptions and 
judgments of research participants because we 
collected data using surveys and interviews. Not all 
family involvements (or NRI associations) are the 
same; some NRI families are more involved than the 
rest, and some NRI families, by virtue of their wealth 
or status can facilitate stronger small business 
performance by providing financial support and by 
participating in the board of directors as foreign 
members.  
 
7. Future Research 
 
Although we have bridged some gaps in the literature, 
many questions still remain unanswered. One such 
question is to understand how small businesses that 
cannot receive financial support from NRIs improve 
the financial performance. Since NRI families by 
virtue of their wealth or status can facilitate stronger 
small business performance by providing financial 
support and by participating in the board of directors 
as foreign members, we call for a direct and objective 
measure of the strength of this involvement in future 
research.    
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Appendix A  
 
Table 1B. Findings (N = 17) 
  
NRIs 
i. Provide financial support to small business owners in India. 
ii. Participate in board decisions of small businesses. 
iii. Connect small business owners with bankers and politicians. 
Note: Perceptions of small business owners  
 
Table 2B. Findings (N = 17) 
 
NRIs 
i. Are involved in the similar line of businesses they help in India, and are educated and experienced. 
ii. Provide financial support to contribute in internal financial resources of small business owners in 
India. 
iii. Participate in board meetings and board decisions of small businesses over the telephone and in person, 
and provide advice on board decisions. 
iv. Improves the financial performance of small businesses. 
Note: Perceptions of NRIs. 
